“Narco-Terrorism”: Key Challenge to a Global Drug Policy Based on Health and Human Rights

Special Section: Health, Rights, and the Future of Global Drug Control

Ambika Satkunanathan

Introduction

States have often used public health as justification for punitive, anti-human rights drug control laws and policies. Recent examples include the designation of fentanyl as a weapon of mass destruction by US President Trump in December 2025 and the US military’s boat strikes on alleged drug traffickers designated as foreign terrorist organizations in the Caribbean and the Pacific, reportedly to stem the trafficking of fentanyl to the United States and protect the health of Americans.[1]

In October 2025, President Trump declared that the United States was engaged in a non-international armed conflict with cartels designated as foreign terrorist organizations, noting that cartel members were considered unlawful combatants subject to military force.[2] Legal experts have called the United States’ action illegal under international law.[3] These developments heralded the entry of the term “narco-terrorism”—hitherto used mainly in the Americas—into global public discourse.

The term narco-terrorism was coined in 1983 by former Peruvian president Belaúnde Terry to describe attacks by drug trafficking groups on law enforcement.[4] In the 1990s, the United States—the concept’s main proponent—helped legitimize this rhetoric by redefining transnational organized crime as a security issue, thereby facilitating its conflation with terrorism. The term continued to be used, albeit inconsistently, in subsequent decades.

The independent expert panel currently reviewing the global drug control system must take note of the resurgence of “narco-terror” narratives and related legal and policy developments, given their potential to obstruct the implementation of progressive drug policies based on health and human rights.

This essay seeks to draw the independent review panel’s attention to the ways that states construct and deploy narratives of “narco-terrorism” to justify increasingly militarized approaches to drug control. It also highlights the resulting downstream harms and emerging policy trajectories that may shape the international drug control system and its human rights impacts.[5]

Normalizing narco-terrorism via states of emergency and militarization

States have normalized the conflation of terrorism and organized crime through militarization and the declaration of states of emergency.[6] States of emergency often restrict civil rights and bestow broad powers of arrest and detention on law enforcement and the military, resulting in human rights violations and deepening militarization.[7] El Salvador, for example, declared a state of emergency in 2022 in response to gang violence. This action has become “a permanent repressive measure under which serious human rights violations, including arbitrary detentions, torture and deaths, have become state policy.”[8] To date, the measure remains in place and is an example of how states of emergency, which are meant to be temporary, can become permanent.

During a state of emergency, the state constructs dominant narratives in which certain social groups are labeled threats to national security. Since drug offenses, much like terrorism offenses, are drafted broadly as catch-all offenses, the securitization and criminalization of certain communities—such as LGBTIQ+ persons, poor people, people who use drugs, or ethno-religious minorities—become easy. [9] The use and abuse of counterterrorism laws to arrest and detain persons involved in drug-related offenses is also common because counterterrorism laws give broad and arbitrary powers to law enforcement.[10]

The militarization of policing is another strategy that enables the merger of the war on terror and war on drugs. Such militarization can take place in two ways—when a state uses the military for policing or when it militarizes the police by training them in military tactics. This often takes place in conjunction with the deliberate construction of a narrative that portrays the military or militarized police as saviors and the only barrier between chaos and order. [11] President Trump’s declaration at the March 2026 Shield of the Americas meeting that “the only way to defeat these enemies is by unleashing the power of our militaries,” as well as the invocation of war language by administration officials, is a demonstration of attempts to normalize militarization as state policy.[12] The Shield of the Americas is a US-led multinational security and political coalition launched by President Trump to advance strategies to combat foreign interference, criminal and narco-terrorist gangs and cartels, and illegal and mass immigration.

Although the United Nations (UN) drug control system is prohibitionist and punitive and has contributed “directly to this environment of human rights risk and violations,” it neither requires nor endorses the use of methods that undermine the rule of law and human rights.[13] As the International Guidelines on Human Rights and Drug Policy point out, “Since the late 1990s, United Nations … resolutions have acknowledged that ‘countering the world drug problem’ must be carried out ‘in full conformity’ with ‘all human rights and fundamental freedoms.’”[14]

The impact of securitized, militarized approaches

In complex contexts grappling with conflict, violence, fragile public institutions, and limited state capacity, designating drug cartels as terrorists

obscures the specific institutional weaknesses—corrupt judiciaries, compromised police forces, captured local governments—that enable cartels to thrive. Addressing this threat requires understanding cartels not as terrorist organizations but as deeply embedded criminal corporations whose power derives from their integration into local economies and political structures.[15]

In Latin American countries, evidence shows militarized approaches to organized crime have increased the precarity of communities that are affected by the activities of cartels.[16] In the United States, African Americans are most affected by the war on drugs.[17] In Australia, Indigenous people are 26 times more likely to be arrested for drug offenses.[18] In Sri Lanka and the Philippines, poor people have been the targets of anti-drug operations.[19] Similar patterns have emerged in the war on terror, with Muslim communities and other ethno-religious groups, such as Tamils in Sri Lanka, targeted under the guise of counterterrorism.[20] Global acceptance and normalization of the conflation of concepts of terrorism and drug trafficking is likely to heighten the discrimination against communities profiled as part of the war against narco-terrorism, as in El Salvador. [21]

The executive order issued by President Trump designating fentanyl as a weapon of mass destruction states that organized criminal networks that manufacture and distribute fentanyl threaten national security.[22] Framing fentanyl, which is on the World Health Organization’s Model List of Essential Medicines, as a security issue instead of a public health issue is yet another challenge to globally expanding the adoption of a health-based approach to the global drug problem.

The reduction in fentanyl deaths in the United States in 2025 is partly attributed to evidence-based public health initiatives, such as harm reduction, which the United States is now defunding.[23] Pursuing an increasingly punitive and carceral approach while denying resources to measures that have proven effective will lead to devastating health and human rights outcomes.[24]

International aid and assistance: Exporting the merger of terrorism and organized crime

International aid and assistance are relevant to efforts to advance a health- and rights-based approach to drug policy because they can enable and entrench securitized, punitive approaches and undermine advocacy for more progressive approaches, particularly by civil society in national contexts.

Countries with heavily militarized police forces, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, have been exporting militarized policing practices around the world through aid by training police and donating military equipment, despite the resulting human rights violations.[25]

The Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) in Bangladesh, which has been accused of serious human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings during anti-drug and counterterrorism operations, was established with assistance from the United States and United Kingdom. Although there is evidence that the United States knew of the violations as early as 2005, the US Ambassador in Dhaka described RAB in 2009 as Bangladesh’s “premier counterterrorism force,” akin to the US Federal Bureau of Investigation.[26] In 2019, the United States invited RAB officials to the United States for training, only to sanction the battalion two years later.[27]

There are further concerns relating to international cooperation, including efforts to normalize narco-terrorism in international processes. For example, at the ninth review of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in July 2026, certain Latin American states sought to expand the link between terrorism and organized crime. At the same time, the United States disrupted these negotiations by pursuing parallel processes centered on a militarized approach to countering narco-terrorism, such as the Shield of the Americas, to combat drug cartels in the Western Hemisphere.

An emerging red flag?

The topic of “terrorism in Africa” is generating interest from UN member states and UN structures. While this is a legitimate concern, the concept is often invoked overly broadly and instrumentalized by states to restrict rights.[28] This creates a risk that issues requiring careful attention—such as the use of Kush in Sierra Leone and its health and social impacts, and reports from South Africa, Nigeria, and Mozambique of drug production linked to Mexico—may instead be employed to fearmonger and encourage states to adopt militarized, punitive approaches.[29] For example, in August 2026, the United States convened 16 African countries that pledged to tackle transnational drug trafficking. One of the group’s aims is to “target networks designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” reflecting the continued conflation of drug trafficking and terrorism.[30] A militarized and carceral approach in Africa would further exacerbate the precarity of persons who use drugs, including those who use drugs to cope with unemployment, poverty, or the unresolved trauma of having been forced to use drugs as child soldiers.[31]

Narrative building: Without fear, there is no national (in)security

The wars on terror and drugs have often been sustained through narratives of insecurity.[32] Governments can fan the fears of the public and use demands for security and safety to justify repressive measures. In doing so, governments can leverage public fear to normalize and create social acceptance of violence and cruelty against those it characterizes as deviant.

In today’s era of artificial intelligence and weakly regulated technologies, states have increasingly powerful tools at their disposal for manipulating and controlling the media to reconstruct reality. These same technologies can also enable both state and nonstate actors to convince the public to readily support the use of repressive tools.

The two wars can also serve as tools of distraction, shifting the public’s attention away from systemic and structural dysfunctionalities such as weakened public institutions and corruption. The gradual weakening of public institutions, systems of checks and balances, and accountability mechanisms—when viewed in the context of rising populism and authoritarianism—can create fertile ground for political actors to weaponize the conflation of terrorism and organized crime, thereby undermining the rule of law and human rights. A national security regime that relies on public fear to obtain support for restrictions on fundamental rights can have grave social consequences.

A national security system therefore needs to be adequately constrained by the national constitution and be accountable to parliament, political parties, and civil society.[33] Richard Sakwa argues that if these safeguards are not in place, two systems can emerge: the normative state, which is “endowed with elaborate powers for safeguarding the legal order as expressed in statutes,” and the prerogative or administrative state, which “exercises unlimited arbitrariness and violence unchecked by any legal guarantees.”[34] This can lead to a situation in which, despite the existence of legal mechanisms that function as checks and balances, state structures are, in practice, subject to the whims of political authorities.[35]

Implications for global drug control and the independent review

States’ conflation of terrorism and drug trafficking should feature prominently in the review panel’s deliberations, for numerous reasons. First, as civil society has highlighted, the international drug control system has historically failed to advance a rights-based approach to drug policy. Civil society has noted that structural reform of the system is essential “if the international drug control machinery is to be seen as a credible engine for the protection and promotion of human rights.”[36] In this historical context, the commingling of terrorism and drug trafficking risks further prioritizing punitive law enforcement measures over health- and rights-based approaches.

In addition, while the war on drugs has mainly targeted poor and marginalized populations, the war on terror has largely focused on ethno-religious minorities. In doing so, both wars have contributed to discrimination and violations against the communities they target. A conflation at the legal and policy levels of these two frameworks would worsen the inequities suffered by these groups. In this light, the independent review panel must unequivocally reaffirm the imperative that counterterrorism and anti-drug state action conform to human rights standards.

Language is also important. The current UN drug control system, while premised on the “health and welfare of mankind,” is framed in terms of an existential threat. This is evident in the preamble to the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, which presents the drug trade as a threat to the “economic, cultural and political foundations of society.”[37] The review panel must grapple with the dangerous outcomes of this type of language in international law and seek to move from a threat-based framing to one centered on health, development, and human rights.

As noted earlier, there is also growing concern about the foisting on Africa, by countries pursuing self-serving regional interests, of securitized and militarized approaches to drug policy that have failed in other contexts and resulted in human rights violations.

Finally, international assistance is a key element of global cooperation on drugs, as well as a requirement of the 1988 drug trafficking convention. It can also serve a tool to exercise power over other countries, as has long been the case with US anti-drug efforts. The independent review of global control cannot overlook the complex and problematic nature of international aid and assistance, including its capacity to undermine human rights. What gets funded shows what governments are interested in, and it is not always a health- and human rights-based approach to drug policy.

Ambika Satkunanathan, LLB, LLM, is a human rights advocate based in Sri Lanka and a former member of the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka.

Please address correspondence to the author. Email: ambikasat@gmail.com.

Competing interests: None declared.

Copyright © 2026 Satkunanathan. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits unrestricted noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

References

[1] The White House, “Designating Fentanyl as a Weapon of Mass Destruction: Executive Order No. 14367” (December 15, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/12/designating-fentanyl-as-a-weapon-of-mass-destruction/; Letter from President Donald Trump to Charles Grassley, President Pro Tempore of the US Senate (September 4, 2025), https://warpowers.lawandsecurity.org/reports/20250904a/.

[2] A. Madhani and L. Mascaro, “Trump Declares U.S. in ‘Non-International Armed Conflict’ with Drug Cartels,” PBS News (October 2, 2025), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/trump-declares-u-s-in-non-international-armed-conflict-with-drug-cartels; E. Mitchell, “Trump Declares ‘Armed Conflict’ with Drug Cartels After Caribbean Strikes,” The Hill (October 2, 2025), https://thehill.com/homenews/5535523-trump-armed-conflict-drug-cartels-caribbean/.

[3] M. Lederman, “Legal Flaws in the Trump Administration’s Notice to Congress on ‘Armed Conflict’ with Drug Cartels,” Just Security (October 3, 2025), https://www.justsecurity.org/121844/trump-notice-drug-cartels/; M. Lederman, “The Many Ways in Which the September 2 Caribbean Strike Was Unlawful … and the Grave Line the Military Has Crossed,” Just Security (September 10, 2025), https://www.justsecurity.org/120296/many-ways-caribbean-strike-unlawful/.

[4] D. Teiner, “Cartel-Related Violence in Mexico as Narco-Terrorism or Criminal Insurgency: A Literature Review,” Perspectives on Terrorism 14/4 (2020).

[5] For a comprehensive analysis of the concepts of terrorism and drug trafficking in international law, see United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Specia Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Ben Saul: Distinguishing Organised Crime from Terrorism to Protect Human Rights, UN Doc. A/81/227 (2026).

[6] This paper uses Cynthia Enloe’s definition of militarization as “a step-by-step process by which a person or a thing gradually comes to be controlled by the military or comes to depend for its well-being on militaristic ideas,” in Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives (University of California Press, 2000), p. 3.

[7] K. Prabha, “Narco-Terrorism and India’s Security,” Strategic Analysis: A Monthly Journal of the IDSA 24/10 (2001).

[8] InterReligious Task Force on Central America, “El Salvador: Silence Is Not an Option—Cristosal’s Report on the Second Year under the State of Exception” (July 10, 2024), https://www.irtfcleveland.org/news/articles/el-salvador-silence-not-option-cristosal%E2%80%99s-report-second-year-under-state-exception; J. Gavarrete, “A Permanent State of Exception in El Salvador,” Dissent Magazine (Fall 2025), https://dissentmagazine.org/article/a-permanent-state-of-exception-in-el-salvador/.

[9] C. Hanssens, A. C. Moodie-Mills, A. J. Ritchie, et al., A Roadmap for Change: Federal Policy Recommendations for Addressing the Criminalisation LGBT People and People Living with HIV (Center for Gender and Sexuality Law at Columbia Law School, 2014); R. Burns, “How the Drug War Is a Tool to Criminalize LGBTQ+ People,” Filter Magazine (June 1, 2020), https://filtermag.org/drug-war-lgbtq-rights/; United Nations Development Programme, Reflections on Drug Policy and Its Impact on Human Development: Innovative Approaches (2016).

[10] I. Bandara, “Arrest of Kehelbaddara Padme Continues to Lead to Organised Crime and Drug Trafficking Deals,” Sunday Times (September 14, 2025), https://www.sundaytimes.lk/250914/news/arrest-of-kehelbaddara-padme-continues-to-lead-to-organised-crime-and-drug-trafficking-deals-612230.html.

[11] “It’s a War: Marco Rubio Labels Ecuadorian Cartels Foreign Terrorists,” Al Jazeera (September 4, 2025), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/4/its-a-war-marco-rubio-labels-ecuadorian-cartels-foreign-terrorists.

[12] See A. P. Esclusa, “Shield Alliance Targets Cartels Across the Americas,” GIS Reports (May 25, 2026), https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/shield-of-the-americas-targets-cartels/; US Department of State, “Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Mexican Foreign Secretary Juan Ramón de la Fuente at a Joint Press Availability” (September 3, 2025), https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/09/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-and-mexican-foreign-secretary-juan-ramon-de-la-fuente-at-a-joint-press-availability.

[13] R. Lines, R. Elliott, J. Hannah, et al., “The Case for International Guidelines on Human Rights and Drug Control,” Health and Human Rights 19/1 (2017); Transnational Institute, The UN Drug Control Conventions: A Primer (2015).

[14] United Nations Development Programme, World Health Organization, Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, et al., International Guidelines on Human Rights and Drug Policy (2019).

[15] J. A. Ochoa, E. G. C. Coria, and J. T. L. Díaz, “Mexican Cartels and U.S. National Security: Between Criminal Economies and Securitization Discourses,” International Journal of Contemporary Security Studies 2/1 (2026), p. 68.

[16] Ibid.

[17] ACLU, “Black America: Casualties of the ‘War on Drugs” (September 1, 2010), https://www.aclu.org/documents/aclu-history-black-america-casualties-war-drugs.

[18] Australian Bureau of Statistics, Corrective Services, Australia: National and State Statistics on Adult Prisoners and Community-Based Corrections, Including Legal Status, Custody Type and Demographics (September 16, 2026), https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/crime-and-justice/corrective-services-australia/latest-release; B. Murphy and M. Tillman, “Study Finds Aboriginal Adults Caught with Cannabis More Likely to Go to Court,” ABC News (June 12, 2023), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-06-12/fewer-aboriginal-adults-cautioned-when-found-with-cannabis/102451008.

[19] M. Lhopital and K. Pfeilstücker, “Sri Lanka: Minor Drug Offense, High Stakes,” Prison Insider (July 5, 2023), https://www.prison-insider.com/en/articles/sri-lanka-delit-mineur-lourde-peine; Amnesty International, “Philippines: Duterte’s ‘War on Drugs’ Is a War on the Poor” (February 4, 2017), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/02/war-on-drugs-war-on-poor/.

[20] A. Satkunanathan, “Not All Detainees Are Equal: Class, Ethnicity and the Prevention of Terrorism Act,” Groundviews (January 17, 2021), https://groundviews.org/2021/01/17/not-all-detainees-are-equal-class-ethnicity-and-the-prevention-of-terrorism-act/.

[21] F. Pacas, “The Tears No One Sees: The Unseen Victims of El Salvador’s Security Strategy,” Atlantic Fellows for Social and Economic Equity (January 15, 2026), https://afsee.atlanticfellows.lse.ac.uk/en-gb/blogs/the-tears-no-one-sees-the-unseen-victims-of-el-salvadors-security-strategy.

[22] The White House, “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Designates Fentanyl as a Weapon of Mass Destruction” (December 15, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/12/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-designates-fentanyl-as-a-weapon-of-mass-destruction/.

[23] D. Dowell, N. Nataraj, M. Rikard, et al., “Why Have Overdose Deaths Decreased? Widespread Fentanyl Saturation and Decreased Drug Use Among Key Drivers,” Lancet Regional Health – Americas 51 (2025).

[24] Transform Drug Policy Foundation, “Designating Fentanyl as a WMD Has Nothing to Do with Drug Control,” Transform (December 18, 2025), https://transformdrugs.org/blog/designating-fentanyl-as-a-wmd-has-nothing-to-do-with-drug-control.

[25] US Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit of the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Information Security Program Pursuant to the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (2019), https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/2019-03/a1912.pdf.

[26] “US Embassy Cables: Ambassador Said Controversial Parliamentary Force Could Become ‘Bangladeshi FBI,’” The Guardian (January 14, 2009), https://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/187025.

[27] A. Riaz, “US Sanctions on Bangladesh’s RAB: What Happened? What’s Next?,” Atlantic Council (December 17, 2021), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/southasiasource/us-sanctions-on-bangladeshs-rab-what-happened-whats-next/.

[28] B. Saul, “Roundtable Dialogue: Counter-Terrorism Priorities in Africa—Key Issues for African Civil Society for the Ninth Review of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy” (March 18, 2026), https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/terrorism/sr/activities/sr-ct-africa-gcts-18-3-2026.pdf; Article 16, “Africa: National Counterterrorism Mechanisms Must Have Independent Oversight” (August 5, 2026), https://www.article19.org/resources/africa-national-counterterrorism-mechanisms-must-have-independent-oversight/.

[29] K. de Bruijne, Kush in Sierra Leone: West-Africa’s Growing Synthetic Drugs Challenge and Europe’s and China’s Part in It (Clingendael Institute, 2025); “Sierra Leone Declares National Emergency After Steep Rise in Use of Deadly Synthetic Drug Kush,” CNN (April 16, 2024), https://edition.cnn.com/2024/04/06/africa/sierra-leone-emergency-kush-intl; S. Jolaoso, “How Mexican Drug Cartels Have Outsourced Meth Labs to Nigeria” (July 28, 2026), https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crmrnxp4nllo; C. Dolley, “US General Warns That Mexican Cartel Activity in Africa, Including SA, Boosts Terrorism,” Daily Maverick (May 26, 2026), https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2026-05-26-us-general-warns-that-mexican-cartel-activity-in-africa-including-sa-boosts-terrorism/.

[30] US Embassy in Cabo Verde, “16 African Nations + U.S. Join Forces to Tackle Transnational Drug Trafficking” (August 7, 2026), https://cv.usembassy.gov/16-african-nations-u-s-join-forces-to-tackle-transnational-drug-trafficking/.

[31] A. Conteh, SSHAP West Africa Hub: Addressing the Kush Epidemic in Sierra Leone,” Social Science in Humanitarian Action Platform (Social Science in Humanitarian Action, 2024).

[32] D. Ojeda, “War and Tourism: The Banal Geographies of Security in Colombia’s ‘Retaking’,” Geopolitics 18/4 (2013).

[33] R. Sakwa, “The Dual State in Russia,” Post-Soviet Affairs 26/3 (2010).

[34] Ibid, p. 187.

[35] Ibid, p. 190.

[36] International Drug Policy Consortium, The UNGASS Decade in Review: Gaps, Achievements and Paths for Reform (2026), p. 38.

[37] Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1582 UNTS 95 (1988), preamble.