Politics of Health in a State of Exception: Martial Law in South Korea

FIGHT FOR RIGHTS VIEWPOINT

Yeon Jung Yu, Eojin Yi, Young Su Park, Martin McKee, and Jiho Cha

On December 3, 2024, President Yoon Suk Yeol declared martial law in South Korea—the first such invocation since the country’s democratization in 1987 and widely regarded as a serious breach of constitutional norms. In a late-night televised address, he claimed that the decree was necessary “to protect the Republic of Korea’s freedom from North Korean communist forces and to eradicate pro-North anti-state elements.” This rhetoric, which recalled Cold War–era ideological binaries, was criticized for portraying domestic dissent as a national security threat. The announcement led to immediate protests outside the National Assembly, prompting lawmakers to pass an emergency resolution demanding its repeal. Within six hours, President Yoon rescinded the order in a second live broadcast, amid growing political backlash and public outrage.[1]

In his martial law decree, President Yoon invoked a rarely used emergency clause—article 77(3) of the South Korean Constitution, which states that “under extraordinary martial law, special measures may be taken with respect to the necessity for warrants, freedom of speech, the press, assembly and association, or the powers of the Executive and the Judiciary under the conditions as prescribed by Act.” The declaration ordered all medical personnel, including resident doctors on strike, to return to work within 48 hours, warning that failure to comply would lead to Cheodan (a legal term referring to punishment under martial law, including imprisonment of up to three years).[2] This was the first time in South Korea’s democratic era that martial law powers were used to suppress labor protests in the medical sector. The order sparked immediate backlash, with many medical academics and institutions calling for Yoon’s impeachment.

Even before the declaration of martial law, President Yoon had demonstrated increasingly authoritarian tendencies. In February 2024, ahead of the pivotal general election held in April 2024 that would determine the composition of the National Assembly, he capitalized on widespread public frustration with the underfunded health system to announce, without presenting clear arguments, a massive expansion of medical school admissions. The annual intake would rise from 3,058 to 5,058 students in 2025 (a 65.4% increase).[3] Medical associations challenged the absence of a rationale and emphasized that the real issue lay in the distribution, not the absolute number, of doctors.[4] They also questioned the feasibility of such a rapid expansion, given the need for additional faculty, facilities, and clinical training sites, all concerns consistent with international experience.[5]

In response, on February 20, 2024, thousands of medical residents resigned en masse to avoid criminal penalties for collective action, which could include up to three years’ imprisonment or a US$20,000 fine. This wave of resignations was both a legal precaution and a collective protest against the erosion of labor rights in the medical sector.[6] Industrial action by doctors often reflects deep-rooted systemic issues, and Korean doctors had long expressed profound disillusionment.[7] This exodus severely disrupted patient care, potentially delaying critical treatments such as cancer surgeries and emergency interventions while straining hospital finances.[8] Most medical students also took leave of absence, while the remaining staff prioritized critically ill patients and deferred non-urgent surgeries.

The government escalated the confrontation with doctors by mobilizing public health care facilities and military hospitals. The Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters instructed police to hold hospital administrators legally accountable for any harm to patients. Patients were explicitly encouraged by government agencies to document interactions as potential evidence for lawsuits against doctors, a move that deeply eroded trust in the doctor-patient relationship.[9]

Government-aligned media heightened the conflict, demonizing doctors through sensational coverage and state-funded advertisements that portrayed them as unethical elites abandoning vulnerable patients. Although most doctors caring for critically ill patients continued working despite this atmosphere of hostility, the demonization profoundly damaged morale across the profession.

However, the conflict with the medical community was not the primary trigger for martial law; mounting political crises, including allegations of corruption involving the first lady and escalating tensions with the National Assembly over constitutional oversight, appear to have played a decisive role. Observers noted that the declaration enabled the administration to reassert control not only over striking doctors but also over broader dissent, under the guise of a national emergency.

Emerging evidence from police and prosecutors indicates that President Yoon had been preparing for a “state of exception” for several months before declaring martial law. In the South Korean context, this term refers to a suspension of constitutional norms, most visibly through the imposition of martial law. The president’s preparations included directives to hospitals to prepare for mass casualties and to clear psychiatric and rehabilitation beds, which displaced vulnerable patients in need of continuous care.[10] Further information on Yoon’s actions is expected following the Constitutional Court’s recent decision to uphold his December 2024 impeachment by the National Assembly.

Populist leaders frequently manipulate public discontent, redirecting blame away from politicians and onto scientists and health professionals. This strategy is used to deflect attention from exceptional measures that undermine democracy and the rule of law. Such tactics often accompany broader efforts to erode trust in expertise, delegitimize dissent, and consolidate executive power. Currently, populist movements challenge established norms, institutions, and the role of scientific evidence across many democracies. In the South Korean context, the medical community’s collective resistance, despite threats of criminalization, has become emblematic of democratic resilience. Whether health professionals elsewhere will similarly resist when facing comparable threats remains an urgent question.

Following the impeachment of President Yoon, the new administration has presented a fundamentally different approach to addressing long-standing tensions in the health care sector. As part of its campaign platform, it pledged to recalibrate medical school admissions on the premise that artificial intelligence will become a central part of future health care delivery. It also promised to strengthen public health care through expanded digital infrastructure and to reduce regional disparities in access to essential services. This approach reframes recurring health care conflicts not merely as political confrontations or disputes between professional groups but as structural challenges that must be addressed in response to technological change. By centering policy on science and technology, the administration aims to shift the focus from partisan politics to systemic reform. Ultimately, it is how these reforms become implemented that will determine whether this direction leads to genuine trust in the system and the manifestation of individuals’ right to health or whether it transfers unresolved structural inequalities into a tech-forward apparatus.

Yeon Jung Yu is an associate professor in the Department of Anthropology, Western Washington University, Bellingham, United States.

Eojin Yi is a senior secretary at Jiho Cha’s Office, National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, Seoul, Republic of Korea.

Young Su Park is an assistant professor in the Department of the History of Medicine and Medical Humanities, Seoul National University College of Medicine, Seoul, Republic of Korea.

Martin McKee is a professor of European public health in the Department of Health Services Research and Policy, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, United Kingdom.

Jiho Cha is a congressman of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea.

Please address correspondence to Yeon Jung Yu. Email: yjy.anthropology@gmail.com.

Competing interests: None declared.

Copyright © 2025 Yu, Yi, Park, McKee, and Cha. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits unrestricted noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

References    

[1] J. Kim and J. H. Park, “Timeline: The Swift Rise and Fall of Martial Law in South Korea,” Korea Pro (December 5, 2024), https://koreapro.org/2024/12/timeline-the-swift-rise-and-fall-of-martial-law-in-south-korea/.

[2] “Full Text of South Korea’s Martial Law Decree,” Reuters (December 3, 2024), https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/full-text-south-koreas-martial-law-decree-2024-12-03/.

[3] B.-K. Lee, “The Dispute over Increasing Medical Student Numbers in South Korea,” Journal of the Korean Association of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgeons 50/3 (2024).

[4] J.-M. Park and J. Kim, “Explainer: Why Are South Korean Trainee Doctors on Strike over Medical School Quotas?,” Reuters (February 21, 2024), https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/why-are-south-korean-trainee-doctors-strike-over-medical-school-quotas-2024-02-21/.

[5] U. Geary, M. McKee, and K. Petty-Saphon, “Mind the Implementation Gap: A Systems Analysis of the NHS Long Term Workforce Plan to Increase the Number of Doctors Trained in the UK Raises Many Questions,” British Medical Bulletin 150/1 (2024).

[6] S. Ahn, “The Abyss from Which We Must Arise Despite Our Pain: The 2024 Medical Crisis and the Moral Injury of Medical School Professors,” Korean Medical Education Review 26/2 (2024).

[7] L. G. Weil, G. B. Nun, and M. McKee, “Recent Physician Strike in Israel: A Health System Under Stress?,” Israel Journal of Health Policy Research 2/1 (2013).

[8] S. E. Gong, “As Medical Strike Drags on in South Korea, Patients Are on Edge,” NPR (September 15, 2024), https://www.npr.org/2024/09/15/nx-s1-5113082/as-medical-strike-drags-on-in-south-korea-patients-are-on-edge.

[9] M. McKee, M. C. V. Schalkwyk, R. Greenley, and G. Permanand, “Placing Trust at the Heart of Health Policy and Systems,” International Journal of Health Policy and Management 13 (2024).

[10] L. Hae-Rin, “Mental Trauma and Institutional Chaos: Demands for Apology Grow over Martial Law Plan,” Korea Times (December 23, 2024), https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/southkorea/society/20241223/koreans-demand-president-yoon-suk-yeols-apology-for-causing-mental-trauma-from-martial-law-chaos.